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Abstract 
 
 
Surveillance is a process that observes behaviour, recognises properties and 
identifies individuals. It has become a commonplace phenomenon in our 
everyday life. Many surveillance practices depend on the use of advanced 
technologies to collect, store and process data. We propose (i) an abstract 
definition of surveillance; and (ii) an abstract definition of identity, designed to 
capture the common structure of many disparate surveillance situations. We argue 
that the notion of identity is fundamental to surveillance. Rather than having a 
single identity, individuals have many identities, real and virtual, that are used in 
different aspects of their lives. Most aspects of life are subject to some form of 
surveillance, and observations and identities can be aggregated. The notion of 
identity needs to be theorised. Our analysis is very general and, at the same time, 
sufficiently precise to be the basis of mathematical models.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Once, the word surveillance was reserved for criminological contexts, such as the traditional 
scrutiny of suspects or contemporary pre-crime practices. Nowadays, the notion is much 
more general as surveillance practices are increasingly becoming a natural component of our 
everyday life. Modern marketing and customer relations management depend upon the 
effective monitoring and classification of individuals’ interests and tastes. Such surveillance 
can be of a high standard and can certainly expedite their everyday lives. The classification of 
individuals into categories is a necessary consequence, explicit or implicit, of surveillance. In 
pre-crime, the categories are used for the assignment of risk. In all cases, the categories affect 
individuals’ opportunities or treatments.  
 
David Lyon has emphasised a general conception of surveillance, which he has characterised 
as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, 
management, protection or detection” (2007a: 14). Furthermore, “this attention to personal 
details is not random, occasional or spontaneous; it is deliberate and depends on certain 
protocol and techniques” (ibid.). Lyon (2003, 2007b) has emphasised the significance of 
considering contemporary surveillance as social sorting. He defined the term to mean the 
“focus on the social and economic categories and the computer codes by which personal data 
is organized with a view to influencing and managing people and populations” (Lyon, 2003: 
2). Social sorting has become the main purpose of surveillance, since surveillance today is 
overwhelmingly about personal data.  
 
The rise of surveillance leads to an emphasis on monitoring the behaviours from selected 
individuals, through groups of people, to the entire population. The growth and effectiveness 
of the monitoring are made possible by all sorts of new technologies, especially software 
technologies. However, surveillance as social sorting is becoming increasingly significant, 
not merely because of the abundance and availabilities of new technological devices. Rather, 
these devices are required because of the increasing number of perceived and actual risks, 
and consequently, the desire to monitor the behaviour of the entire population (cf. Lyon, 
2003).   
 
The notion of identity is to be found at the heart of all contemporary surveillance practices 
(Ball et al., 2012). Many forms of surveillance systems are supported by identity management 
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systems that depend on technologies to provide information on identity. The systems of 
fingerprinting (Cole, 2001), iris scans (Lyon, 2001), facial recognition systems (Introna & 
Wood, 2004), DNA samples (Wallace, 2006), passport (Torpey, 2000) and National Identity 
Register (NIR) (UK Government, 2006) are used for accuracy of identification. The UK 
Government’s Foresight Programme investigated the future of identity in a major project in 
order to explore how transformations in technology, politics, economics, our environment 
and demographics will change our notion of identity (Foresight, 2013). The rapid speed of 
developments in technology, especially those brought about the Internet, has been identified 
as the key driver in the transformation, and thus, the problematization of identity. Notions of 
identity are central to surveillance, and nowadays, the notions include both data from 
embodied individuals, and increasingly, data about these individuals to be found circulating 
in the Internet (Lyon, 2003). Actually, due to the increasing frequency of non-face-to-face 
interactions, the Internet has become the main method of categorising.  
 
Notions of identity are essential for surveillance practices, since social sorting – the main 
purpose of contemporary surveillance – is about the classification and categorisation of 
personal data. Sociologies of surveillance as social sorting seem to remain underdeveloped 
(Lyon, 2003). In his article ‘Surveillance, Security and Social Sorting: Emerging Research 
Priorities’, Lyon calls for multidisciplinary approaches towards surveillance to achieve a 
better understanding of, amongst other things, “the dynamics of social sorting and the social 
implications of the new technologies” (2007b: 168). This article offers a theoretical analysis 
of surveillance focusing on identity. Although tailored to the use of software technologies, 
the analysis covers a wide range of surveillance practices. Its purpose is to find a concise and 
compact set of concepts that can be used to model most forms of surveillance. Specifically, 
we formulate:  
(i) an abstract definition of surveillance that works in both the physical and virtual 
      worlds; and  
(ii) an abstract definition of identity that applies to people and objects.  
 
The definitions are intended to capture and structure the essential ideas that are common to 
many disparate situations of surveillance. We argue that the notion of identity is fundamental 
to surveillance. We propose that surveillance and identity are fundamentally a matter of 
assigning data to people and objects: 
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(a) the technologies for observing people and objects capture behaviour in data; and  
(b) the identity of objects and people are defined by means of data which we call 
identifiers.  
Our theory of identity is a theory about the creation, provenance, comparison and 
transformation of identifiers. Our analysis is very general and, at the same time, sufficiently 
precise to be articulated in terms of the formal methods of algebra and logic. We wish to 
develop a theory that is not about people and objects but about the data that represents their 
behaviour and identity.   
 
2. Life Devolved to Software 
 
Identity is a part of almost every meaningful interaction among individuals. It is so deeply 
embedded in our daily interactions that we hardly give it much attention (Harper, 2006). The 
role of identity in surveillance theories varies. Traditionally, the nature of identity is an 
unproblematic issue. In each context, identity is assumed to be or at least, treated as 
something stable or unambiguous. Moreover, the range of contexts was limited and tools to 
resolve questions of identity were effective. Nowadays, identity is extended from the 
embodied physical individual or object, to their representations in terms of abstract data in 
multiple databases. Technological development has accelerated the demand to identify 
product, including people and animals, e.g., the identification of farm animals in the UK (UK 
Government, 2013). These demands have changed our appetite for data from a vice to a habit, 
and not merely in a great plurality of identities in multiple databases.  
 
Indeed, as increasing elements of our identities are devolved to technological systems driven 
by software, the relationships between identity and surveillance become technically and 
socially intricate. In sociological terms, these technological systems are known as abstract 
systems. Examples include banking, transportations, e-commerce, mobile 
telecommunications… and last but not least, social media sites.  
 
Living among these systems, surveillance practices involve the creation of new identities that 
represent the individual to which they are attached. These ‘data doubles’, ‘data images’, 
‘digital personae’ or ‘additional selves’ are created through surveillance processes (Lyon, 
1994; Haggerty & Ericson, 2000; Clark 1994, respectively). In short, an individual’s data 
doubles are various concatenations of personal data that represent the individual in different 
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systems belonging to different organisations.  Access to these systems requires an entry in an 
appropriate database and the presentation of the correct data as a key. In these processes, the 
data double is the individual’s identity for the purpose of that system and that organisation: 
identity is reduced to codes, passwords or signatures (cf., Deleuzian, 2002).
1
 In this way, the 
practices of identity management originate in online environments have already entered the 
physical world (O’Hare & Stevens, 2006).  
 
Indeed, surveillance is about data and essential to contemporary surveillance practices are 
software technologies and hardware devices that collect, store and process data. Currently, 
the growth and effectiveness of surveillance are made possible by all sorts of new 
technologies, especially software technologies. They are increasingly becoming a natural 
component of our everyday life as various forms of surveillance practices are routinely built 
into our physical and virtual environments. Surveillance is a process of data gathering that 
involves the systematic observation of behaviours and individuals, and the identification of 
the ones that are deemed to have specific attributes (see: Figure 1). 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Data doubles are vulnerable to alteration, addition, merging and loss as they travel. The 
ongoing life of the data doubles depends upon complex information infrastructures.  
Surveillance 
 
 
Data 
Software 
Formal Methods 
Behaviour Attribute Identity 
Hardware Devices 
Figure 1: The Conceptual Framework 
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Many systems that shape and hold together contemporary life are made with software. These 
technologies have surveillance capabilities, which may be unintended rather than intended. 
Actually, all software technologies that we use in everyday life naturally collect, store and 
process data about their own operation and, therefore, can be the basis of surveillance 
technologies. It is widely recognised that computers and software are responsible for the 
staggering growth of large data sets. Indeed, software is created for users to process data. 
However, since the earliest computers, designers of software have created tools to monitor 
the operation and performance of their systems. The tools are necessary to maintain and 
improve their software. Operating systems that manage computers and their peripherals need 
diagnostic programs for system administrators to detect and correct faults, install special 
software, remove malware, and rescue lost data and connections. At low levels of abstraction, 
the software tools close to machine architectures are used in computer forensics (e.g., for 
reconstructing memory). The design of diagnostic programs that monitor and analyse systems 
is natural in software engineering. Thus, where there is software, there are likely to be 
programs collecting and recording data on its operation and, therefore, on the activities of its 
users. Nowadays, various kinds of software are embedded in many domestic objects from 
cars to washing machines – called embedded systems. An embedded system is a computer 
system with a dedicated function within a larger physical system. Typically, it controls a 
mechanical or electrical system, collecting data and computing via sensors, actuators and 
processors. Dodge and Kitchin (2009, 2011) offer a taxonomy of some objects employing 
software. They coin the term logject for an object that monitors and records its own use in 
some ways. The records can be stored and transmitted and so analysed. The smart phone is a 
primary example: it manages itself, adapts to the environment and is highly programmable by 
millions of apps. 
 
Examples of software systems intended for surveillance are plentiful. During the past two 
decades, there has been a significant and continuous growth in the use of surveillance and 
identity technologies. Actions and events are addressed by Closed-Circuit Television 
(CCTV), Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems, the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) and electronic tagging. Personal identities are managed with Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) cards, PIN numbers, coded entry systems, biometric recognition 
systems and DNA profiling. These forms of surveillance and identity technologies enable the 
recording, storing and processing of data in digital forms. In turn, the wide spread adoption 
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and combination of such technologies further stimulates the rise of surveillance, in both 
physical and virtual surroundings, turning the concept of global surveillance into a plausible 
prospect. 
 
Besides these technologies deliberately created for surveillance purposes, surveillance is 
often intentionally included in various everyday technologies, such as couriers who deliver 
packages, inspectors who collect data and operators in call centres. Individuals who work 
with ICT systems have long been aware that the systems that they use in their work are also 
intended to be a source of data about their performance – complete recordings of the 
transactions are made.  
 
In social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and YouTube, various forms of 
technologies are used to gather personal data. For example, geotagging is one of the latest 
forms of tagging that allows real-time surveillance. Often, geotagging is used in (i) searching 
social media postings on sites by location and finding individuals; and then (ii) exploring 
their profiles to find out their private information (e.g., home address and phone number) 
(Smyser and Holt, 2012). In the Android world, an app called eBlaster Mobile can be used to 
watch over phone usage of children or employees by (i) monitoring text messaging, voice, 
and Web surfing activity on the Android device; and (ii) logging the physical location of the 
smartphone (Bradley, 2011).  
 
In more extreme cases, social rules and norms can be approximated by algorithmic formulae 
to search for deviance automatically, and even render deviance from the roles and norms 
impossible. For example, various cybercommunities are places where ‘dataveillance’ (van der 
Ploeg, 2003: 71) is endemic – every word typed and every movement made can be observed, 
recorded, stored in digital files, and replayed and examined in the future. Actually, in theory, 
it is perfectly possible to turn the world of the Internet into a digital panopticon, where 
surveillance can reach perfection, at least in principle (Wang et al., 2011). 
 
Identity is a core part of existing and developing surveillance practices. The Identity Card Act 
2006 is a very good example. The core of this act is the National Identity Register (NIR) of 
which identity cards are a physical manifestation. The Act’s definition of ‘identity’ refers to 
‘full name, other names by which an individual might previously have been known, gender, 
date and place of birth and external characteristics of his that are capable of being used for 
14-08-2014 
 
8 
 
identifying him’ (UK Government, 2006: 2). It introduces a major restructuring of the way 
identification functions in the UK – identity becomes associated with a singular centralised 
authoritative documentary source. 
 
Unlike identities in the physical world, data doubles have a much greater mobility than their 
physical counterparts, especially in terms of reproduction and transmission. Owing to the 
creation of a polymedia
2
 environment brought about by the rise of communications 
technologies over a range of platforms, we are able to instruct our identities to perform 
different functions in a digital networked world. The increased use of mobile technologies 
(smart-phones and tablets) and various apps associated with these technologies have 
catalysed the explosion of the hyper-connectivity, increasing social plurality, and blurring of 
public and private identities. The data doubles are creations of information, and are 
constantly updated due to the information flowing from the individuals (Lyon, 2007a). In 
extreme cases, they can experience a life of their own and can have significant impact on 
decision making. Various forms of identities, physical and digital, have the potential to have 
very real influence on the individual’s life chances and opportunities. The core articulation of 
the problem of surveillance is that identity is problematised.  Thus, in the context of a general 
definition of surveillance, identity must be checked and secured.  
 
3. A General Definition of Surveillance 
 
A surveillance system observes the behaviour of people and objects in space and time; 
classifies behaviours into attributes; and identifies people and objects with some of those 
attributes. With a wide range of contexts and specific examples in mind, we begin to analyse 
four concepts that capture the structure of surveillance systems.  
 
Definition. Abstractly, we say that a surveillance system consists of the following 
components and methods: 
 
1. Entity. Entities that are people or objects that possess behaviour in space and time;  
2. Observable behaviour. Methods for observing and recording behaviours;  
                                                          
2
 A condition where individuals are free to choose between a number of equally available 
forms of media, such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace … (Madianou & Miller, 2012).   
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3. Attribute. Methods for defining and recognising attributes of behaviours, based on 
rules, norms, practices, and other observable properties; and  
4. Identity. Methods for generating data that identify entities which exhibit the attributes 
and locate them in space and time.  
 
Commonly, we expect the attributes to be deviations from sets of rules, norms, practices, etc. 
However, the definition does not imply deviance: the definition does require precise 
formulations of attributes. The data that identifies entities include numbers, texts, sounds and 
images.  
 
First, we look at particular examples of surveillance systems to see these concepts in situ: (i) 
cars; (ii) smartphones; and (iii) Twitter. 
 
Example 1: Cars. ANPR is a technology that observes cars and recognises number plates, 
possibly using infra-red so as to function day and night. Common applications are checking 
on vehicle speed, managing car parking and collecting tolls. The technology was functioning 
in the late 1970s; today, ANPR can be found in thousands of fixed surveillance systems 
owned by both public and private organisations.
3
 We describe some British ANPR 
applications to test our abstract definition.  
 
The entities in such surveillance systems are cars at a particular location and time; they may 
be in transit (speed check), or entering or leaving a location (car park, city zone).The method 
the system uses for observing the cars is a camera that creates an image that may be 
communicated and stored. This image is processed by software that will recognise a 
behavioural attribute (e.g., breaking a speed limit) and, in particular, performs optical 
character recognition to establish the registration mark of a car. The registration mark is an 
alpha-numeric name that identifies a vehicle uniquely. On communicating this registration 
mark, the identity of the entity is established. For example, the output of such surveillance 
systems is the identity of a vehicle travelling too fast, or arriving or leaving a particular 
location. For example, a surveillance system for car parking based on an ANPR consists of:  
Entity: Cars 
                                                          
3
 The number of fixed speed camera sites in England increased to 2,331 in 2012 (Massey, 
2012).  
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Observable Behaviour: Arrival and departure at location  
Attributes: Duration of stay above a particular limit 
Identity: Registration marks  
 
Actually, it is important to note that such surveillance systems deliver identities of vehicles 
rather than people. The process of observing the behaviours of drivers is actually a process of 
matching people to data. Following the ANPR stages described above, the registration mark 
is communicated to a database relevant to the application. For example, the database may be 
used to check an attribute, such as a payment (tax, charge or toll) having been made for that 
registration mark. If a deviant attribute is detected then, in order to find the driver, the keeper 
of the vehicle must be located and contacted. In the UK, the operator of the surveillance 
system communicates the registration mark to the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency 
(DVLA) to determine the name and address of the keeper. The output of this process is the 
identity of the keeper. Finding the driver may require further action. Note that in this 
interpretation there is a transformation of identity data; identity changes from the registration 
mark to the name and address of the keeper. Thus, coupled to the surveillance system are 
independent systems processing identities, in order to locate a person.  
 
Example 2: Smartphones. A smartphone is a mobile phone built on an operating system 
(e.g., Android, iOS and BlackBerry 10). A modern smartphone includes various types of 
advanced software that could be used for surveillance purposes, including a compact digital 
camera; a pocket video camera; a Global Positioning System (GPS); an accelerometer; high 
speed data access provided by Wi-Fi and mobile broadband; and last but by no means least, 
all sorts and kinds of apps. These technical features (i) allow smartphones to be used by their 
owners as spies in their pockets to surveil; and, conversely, at the same time, (ii) these 
individuals could be surveilled upon when they are carrying their smartphones with them. 
Common applications of smartphones are to catch offenders (e.g., intelligence and evidence 
gathering); to identify risks to public safety; and to gather otherwise hard-to-get data (peer-to-
peer mutual monitoring) (O’Keeffe, 2011).  
 
In the second case, consider a user of a smartphone who is surveilled upon. The technologies 
in the smartphone (e.g., GPS and accelerometer) make it possible for the movement of the 
smartphone to be tracked to a high degree of accuracy. Technically, a constant stream of data 
is being created and communicated by the smartphone to the service provider. All sorts of 
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properties of the user can be deduced from these data streams, such as conversing, exact 
location (GPS) and even running/walking/driving (accelerometer). The entities are 
smartphones and the observable behaviour is the activity and location of the smartphones. 
The attributes are what interests the surveillance agent, e.g., an activity or a location; and the 
identities are numbers of the smartphones.  
 
It is easy to describe a few smartphone applications in terms of our abstract definition. 
Consider first the case of using a smartphone to surveil. For example, imagine someone 
recording an activity and streaming the video live to a website (e.g., YouTube) – remarkably 
but not uncommonly, an Internet TV channel with live broadcasting can be created from a 
smartphone in one’s pocket. More simply, the smartphone may capture an isolated activity 
that is at risk to public order and safety. The entities may be people or objects and the 
observable behaviour is simply their activity. The attributes are what define risk and the 
identities are represented by images and sound. This rather direct form of surveillance 
delivers data, which is the start of independent processes for identifying people.  
 
Moreover, these properties, e.g., location and activity, of the user’s actions can be combined 
with other data in surveillance to provide more detail about him/her (e.g., mood) and predict 
his/her action. Given that smartphones are ubiquitous and serve personal needs, they have 
tremendous potential in all aspects of surveillance, especially in terms of identifying 
individuals. Actually, a network of smartphones could provide the police with thousands of 
eyes and ears on the streets at any one time, and thus, could create a big society where 
criminals will live in fear of the people and where there is nowhere for them to hide (May, 
2010). Conversely, the network would generate an increasingly large amount of data and 
produce more data than necessary for the originally stated purpose, and in turn, would lead to 
complicated social questions concerned data storage, access and use.
4
 
 
Again, such surveillance systems that employ the use of smartphones as spies deliver data 
about devices rather than people. In this section, we have occupied ourselves with 
surveillance “in relation to non-human phenomena that have only a secondary relevance to 
                                                          
4For an example, Apple’s iPhone and iPad, Google’s Android and Microsoft’s Windows 
Phone 7 operating systems are designed to collect, store and transmit data on users’ physical 
locations to central databases without their consent (Burghardt, 2011). 
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personal details” (Lyon, 2007a). Next, we turn our attention to surveillance in relation to the 
actual person.  
 
4. A General Definition of Identity 
 
The examples of the last section illustrate the four conceptual components of our general 
definition of surveillance systems. They also reveal the necessity of additional systems to 
process their output data. Commonly, the output of a surveillance system is data about the 
identities of devices and machines rather than their users. At this point, a few questions arise: 
 
 What is the nature of the data that is supposed to identify the entities under 
surveillance?  
 How is this data transformed to yield information relevant to the context?  
 How do this transformations lead to the identity of people?  
 
To explore these questions, we will examine the nature of identity with respect to 
surveillance largely by means of examples: (i) cars; (ii) communications; and (iii) customer 
accounts. Currently, individuals tend to have several over-lapping identities, some of which 
could be attributed to developments in technologies, especially these associated with the 
Internet, such as social networking sites (e.g., Facebook and Twitter) and cybercommunities 
(e.g., Second Life and Cyberworlds). A few years ago, McGuire coined the term ‘distributed 
body’ and used it to explain the relationship between the body in the physical world and 
‘some new category (virtual or otherwise)’ (2007: 82). These new categories simply extend 
the physical body’s ability to interact by distributing it across more spheres, including bank 
accounts, my space pages, blogs, mobile phone numbers and game personas (ibid.). 
 
Actually, much of our social interaction is carried out by various forms of abstract 
technological systems rather than direct face-to-face interactions. Whilst interacting with 
each of these systems, an individual needs to give over some of his/her identity, in terms of 
identifiers, to distinguish himself/herself from other users. Thus, rather than having a single 
and holistic identity, individuals now have several separated and overlapping identities. The 
multiplicity of identity, especially the extension of identity from the physical to the virtual 
world has brought us to a new era, wherein the nature of identity needs to be problematised. 
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The rise of virtual identities in various forms of abstract systems, professionally and 
personally has generated new forms of deviant behaviours. This is more so in the virtual 
world since it is created through the notion of anonymity, as well as social and technical 
appetite for multiple identities. 
 
4.1. On Identifiers 
 
Once verified, identities provide access to resources and therefore, become a thing or object 
of some kind. This process gives identity a value that can be traded, sold or stolen. Identifiers 
become assets. Basically, they are snapshots of an individual whose purpose is to allow 
access to resources, typically through information systems. Be it physical or virtual, an 
identity is presented by a data type. Basic personal identifiers are those upon which we rely 
to distinguish a unique human being and guarantee their identity, albeit in some context with 
its own level of rigor. Essential to establishing identity is the collection, storage and 
processing of data. Indeed, identity is almost purely a matter of data. People and objects are 
named, labelled or otherwise denoted by data relevant to some context. The data in question 
captures some relevant aspects of a person or an object. Different identities are managed by 
different kinds of identity management systems. We will look at some examples of these 
systems prior to providing a working definition. Our examples involve birth certificate, health 
records, driving license and National Insurance (NI) number, and demonstrate that identifiers 
are composite objects, in the sense that they are built from other identifiers.  
 
Thus, the purpose of an identifier is to establish when entities are the same or not in the 
surveillance context. Identifiers need not reflect any aspect of the entity or have any meaning 
at all. In our conception of surveillance, entities are observed and identified. This means that 
necessarily, surveillance systems must have methods to define the identity of entities.  
 
Definition. An identifier for an entity is a name that is associated with the entity. By a name 
we commonly mean data made from symbols. In terms of symbols, usually, numbers are 
added to identifiers in order to make an identifier unique.  
 
The relationship between entities and identifiers can be complicated. Logically, four 
situations can arise: 
1. Many – One Associations. Different identifiers can be assigned to the same entity. 
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2. One – One Associations. Different identifiers are assigned to different entities.  
3. One – Many Associations. An identifier can be assigned to more than one entity but 
an entity has only one identifier.  
4. Many – Many Associations. An identifier is assigned to more than one entity and, 
vice versa, an entity can be assigned more than one identifier. 
 
We have defined surveillance to be a process that observes the behaviour of entities and 
reports entities with interesting behaviour. Actually, surveillance reports identifiers which 
may narrow the search for entities but need not pin down the particular entity of interest.  
 
Search Principle: If an association is many-one then given an identifier, we can find or 
search for a set of entities with that identifier. 
 
One-to-one associations are important because: 
 
Uniqueness Principle: If an association is one-one then given an identifier, we can find the 
unique entity with that identifier. 
 
The following point may be obvious but it is certainly profoundly important:  
 
Enumeration Principle: The addition of a number to an identifier of an entity can turn any 
many-one association into a one-one association. 
 
We will illustrate these as follows: 
 
Example 1: Cars. This example illustrates one-one and many-one associations. Each car is 
assigned a registration mark, commonly known as registration number. The current system of 
UK was introduced on 1
st
 September 2001. The association of registration marks to cars is 
one-one. A car has one and only one registered keeper. Thus, the association of a registration 
marks to a keeper is unique. However, a person can be a registered keeper of as many cars as 
he/she wants. Thus, the association of registration marks to keepers is many-one. 
 
The registration document (V5) for a car identifies the car and its keeper. However, it is not 
proof of ownership. The registered keeper is the person who is legally responsible for the car 
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and need not to be the owner of the vehicle. Many people have insurance policies that enable 
them to drive any car with the owner’s permission. Thus, the driver of a car on a particular 
occasion may be only loosely connected to the keeper. The association of cars to drivers is 
one-many.  In terms of formal documents (containing several identifiers), the association 
between registration marks and drivers is complicated and probably incomplete.   
 
Example 2: Communications. This example demonstrates both many-one and many-many 
associations. When connecting a computer to the Internet, a number is needed called an IP 
address (32 bits under IP Protocol 4) that uniquely identifies the machine in the network. In 
some computer networks, such as networks local to an organisation or company, there is an 
IP address for the machine that does not change; these are called static IP addresses. The 
association of computers to IP addresses is one-one. More commonly, at home IP addresses 
are generated by the Internet Service Provider in response to a customer’s need for Internet 
access. Thus, overtime IP addresses can change and the association of IP addresses to a 
particular computer is many-one. Developing this example, if more than one computer is 
accessing the Internet at the same time in a period, from the same service then the association 
between IP addresses and computers is many-many. The changing status seems to be natural 
in time-dependent associations of identifiers.  
 
Example 3: Customer Account. Consider a client’s account with some service company, 
such as a bank, insurance company or shop. Commonly, such an account has the following 
structure (see: Figure 2). The user name and password act as a key simply to gain access to 
the account. The account details establish basic information such as: name, address, services 
provided, etc. The account history not only records the past transactions but allows all sorts 
of new transactions, queries, etc. to be performed. It is the account history that is clearly 
subjected to tests that ensure, for example, terms and conditions are met by the client or that 
no unusual pattern of transactions has been carried out. If each customer account for a 
provider belongs to one and only one person then the association of customer accounts to 
people is one-one. If a customer account can be made available to more than one person – 
such as a joint bank account – then the association of customer accounts to people is one-
many. It is common that whilst accounts may be one-many the systems of identifiers for the 
accounts – involving numbers – are one-one.  
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4.2.  Provenance of identifiers 
 
Creating identifiers is an everyday occurrence; we open accounts, register for services, apply 
for permissions, buy products, etc. For many of these actions, we rely on a handful of pre-
existing identifiers. To open a bank account in the UK, we give a proof of our identity and 
our current address, e.g., using a passport and a recent utility bill. To buy a product, an 
address and a credit card account number are usually sufficient for the vendor: notice the 
dependency on the bank identifier. At face value, the quality of a bank identifier is 
guaranteed by the databases of the state (passport) and, say, an energy provider (utility bill). 
The passport provides a high quality identifier based on a birth certificate, a photograph and 
possibly other biometric data. Example by example, illustrates the general point that: 
 
Principle. The creation of new identifiers depends on pre-existing identifiers. 
 
The dependability of one identifier upon another may be illustrated in an identity tree (see: 
Figure 3). The identifiers that appear in the nodes of the tree can create quite complicated 
dependency networks of identifiers.  
 
The quality of an identifier is essentially a matter of its reliability, which in turn depends on 
its provenance, i.e., the process involved in establishing the identifier. In the case of people, a 
passport is a standard example of a high quality identifier with a rigorous provenance. Since 
identifiers are often built from other identifiers, of central importance is the process of 
comparing identifiers and reducing one type of identifier to another. Recognising a number 
plate of a car behaving badly can lead to a letter arriving at the address of the keeper and 
Figure 2: A Typical Customer Account 
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involves the transformation of a number of high quality identifiers (e.g., registration mark, 
keeper’s name, address and driving history).  
 
In Figure 3 below, establishing the identifier ID1 involves providing evidence in the form of 
other identifiers: ID2-ID6. Thus, the validity of ID1 depends upon, or is reduced to, the 
validities of ID2-ID6. Some of these identifiers have a special status, in that they are designed 
to reliably denote an individual. In the example, these personal identifiers are guaranteed by 
the state (ID4) and biometric data (ID3); in the latter case, ID6 is used to allow a passport to 
be issued by post, without face-to-face interaction.     
 
 
 
 
This example illustrates a general fact about identifiers:  
 
Principle: To establish the provenance of an identifier is to follow a set of paths belongs to a 
tree of identifiers that represents the construction of the identifier.  
 
All of these observations and ideas can be formalised to make a precise and general 
mathematical framework for analysing identifiers. 
 
5. Personal Identity  
 
ID1 = Bank Account 
ID2 = Present Address ID3 = Passport 
ID4 = Birth Certificate ID5 = Photo 
ID6 = Independent Authentication 
Figure 3: Identity Tree 
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Of greatest interest are surveillance systems in which the entities are people, for example, 
birth certificate and photo (see: Figure 3). We consider some examples of assigning data to 
individuals. A fundamental problem is how identifiers can actually identify a specific 
individual.  
 
Example 1: Biometrics. Biometrics refers to the identification of humans by their 
characteristics or traits. Biometric identifiers are the distinctive, measurable characteristics 
used to label and describe individuals. Biometric identifiers are often categorised as 
physiological versus behavioural characteristics. Physiological characteristics are related to 
the body, including fingerprint, face recognition, DNA, palm print, hand geometry, iris 
recognition, retina and odour/scent. Behavioural characteristics are related to the behaviour of 
a person, including typing rhythm, gait and voice. Operationally, as evidence in practice, the 
associations of biometrics to people are assumed to be one-one.  
 
The operational tests used to measure biometrics, such as DNA, finger print and iris, are of 
course, approximate. Thus, it is a matter of high probability that data presented manifests a 
one-one identity association. Current studies suggest that increasingly accurate measurements 
can reveal differences in DNA between, even, twins. Lately, research demonstrates that 
although identical twins share very similar DNA, they are not identical (O’Connor, 2008). 
Recently, when identical twins are identified by DNA evidence as suspects in a series of 
rapes in Marseille, France, officials are likely to pay about $1.3million to compare billions 
pairs of nucleotides that make up DNA rather than compare 400 base pairs in a normal 
analysis (Dicker, 2013). 
 
Example 2: Citizenship. Each individual has or can have a unique passport, driving licence, 
National Health Service (NHS) and National Insurance (NI) number. In the new style red 
passport book, the passport number must be nine characters and all characters must be 
numeric. Each driving licence in England, Scotland and Wales is made up of 18 alpha-
numerics, which codes a great deal of information. Everyone registered with the NHS in 
England and Wales has his/her unique number, which is linked to his/her health record. Each 
NHS number is made up of 10 alpha-numerics in a 3-3-4 format. In the UK, everyone gets a 
NI number just before he/she turns 16. An individual’s NI number makes sure his/her NI 
contributions and taxes are only recorded against her/her name. The format of the number is 
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two prefix letters, six digits and one suffix letter. In these cases, usually numbers are added to 
identifiers in order to make each of these associations one-one.   
 
Example 3: Social Media. Each individual has a unique user name and password 
combination to log into social media sites, such as Facebook, Twitter and MySpace. For 
example, to sign up for a new account on Facebook, an individual needs to enter his/her 
name, birthday, gender and email address into an online form on www.facebook.com prior to 
picking a password. After he/she completes the sign up form, an email would be sent to the 
email address provided. The sign up process is completed by clicking the confirmation link 
embedded in the email. The next stage to create a basic profile to highlight some key 
characteristics of a person, such as basic information (birthday, relationship status, religious 
views…), work and education, relationships and family, and contact information. 
 
The basic structure of a user name and password combination reminds us of our previous 
discussion on customer account (see: Figure 4). Actually, a person’s social media account is 
essentially a client account with some service provider, e.g., Facebook. However, it is not the 
same as a customer account. In a social media account, a person’s ‘User name & password’ 
and ‘Basic personal profile’ form his/her identifier, instead of ‘User name & password’ and 
‘Account details’ in a typical customer account. Communication and interaction with other 
individuals is key in having a social media account, thus ‘interaction history’ forms the last 
part of a typical social media account (recalling the third part of a typical customer account: 
‘account history’). In the case of Facebook, a person’s ‘interaction history’ covers all his/her 
activities on Facebook, such as updating his/her status, commenting on another’s post, status 
or photo, sending another user a private message… The ‘interaction history’ is a part of the 
person’s personhood – the physical body’s ability to interact is extended into the virtual 
sphere of Facebook (McGuire, 2007).  
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6. Surveillance revisited 
 
With the concept of identity clarified we can revise the provisional definition of surveillance. 
First, let us define an identity management system. 
 
Definition. An identity management system for a set of entities is a system with the following 
two properties:   
(i) Generation: the system can create and delete identifiers for entities; and  
(ii) Entity Authentication: the system can, given an entity and identifier, decide whether 
or not the identifier is associated with the entity.  
Another formulation of authentication, which focuses exclusively on the identifiers, is the 
following: 
(iii)    Identity Authentication: the system can, given two identifiers, decide whether or not 
they are associated with the same entity.
5
 
 
                                                          
5 Property (ii) implies property (iii).  
Figure 4: A Typical Social Media Account 
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Our discussion of this is independent of application, since the identifiers can often be used to 
gain access to resources. We are only dealing with access not authorisation. 
 
Definition. A surveillance system is a method of observing the behaviour of entities in a 
certain context.  The context is specified by:  
(i) a collection of attributes of the behaviours;  
(ii) an identity management system that provides identifiers for the entities. 
Surveillance is then a process that, on recognising that the behaviour of an entity has an 
attribute, returns some identifier for that entity.  
 
The concept of social sorting can be formulated in two ways. At first sight, we might say that 
it is simply the process of putting entities into groups or categories defined by some 
properties of their behaviour that they have in common.  This means that the categories are 
defined by attributes of behaviour that are specific to the context of surveillance system 
(rather than any intrinsic nature of the entity). The intention that the different categories of 
entities are to be treated differently is not part of the abstract definition.  
 
The social sorting is output of the surveillance. However, in our conception of surveillance, 
the process outputs not entities but identifiers for entities. Thus, we propose the following: 
 
Definition. A surveillance system is called a social sorting if it is a method of classifying the 
behaviour of entities in a certain context.  The context is specified by  
(i) a collection of attributes of the behaviours;  
(ii) an identity management system that provides identifiers for the entities. 
Then the surveillance system provides a process that builds a collection of categories of 
identifiers. On recognising that the behaviour of an entity has a particular set of attributes the 
system places some identifier for that entity in the category defined by those attributes.  
 
The relationship between identifiers and entities can be complicated and the variety of 
classifications of the identifiers for entities even more so. The definition above is deliberately 
general. It permits the surveillance system to generate the classification by combining 
attributes from a list in different ways. It does not require all the possible identifiers of an 
entity to be in the classification. It allows the different categories to overlap and even allows 
one category to be a subcategory of another. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Identifiers are simply data and belong at the heart of any analysis of surveillance. Our 
research on surveillance, with its emphasis on identity, is intended to develop an abstract 
framework that is both a rigorous conceptual analysis of surveillance and a tool for answering 
questions about applications. We have isolated a general structure or architecture that can be 
found in a large number of apparently disparate surveillance situations – certainly including 
three general typologies of surveillance: controlling, sorting and monitoring (Lyon, 2007a). A 
primary feature of our framework is the combination of systems for observing and 
categorising behaviour, and managing identity. In particular, the abstract notion of identifier 
enables us to make explicit the complexities of establishing personal identity. Identifiers 
seem always to be dependent on other identifiers: verifying identity involves following paths 
through a network of inter-related identifiers.  
 
There are several more basic topics that need to be analysed and added to this framework. 
Although we have accommodated social sorting in our framework, its abstract analysis is 
clearly a necessary and complex next step. Another example is to formulate general concepts 
and principles for comparing identity management systems: in particular to structure the 
process of reducing or translating one identity management system into another.  
 
Common to all surveillance technologies are software systems. This is because the collection, 
storage and processing of data is the ‘raison d'être’ of software. The study of data is the basis 
of the science of surveillance. In particular, in surveillance, we must study:  
(i) the representation of various forms of data (visual, sonic, audio and textual);  
(ii) the construction, provenance and validity of data;  
(iii) the transformation and aggregation of data;  
(iv) access control, communication and privacy of data; and, of course; and 
(v) the huge variety of computation of these data.  
 
The latter point is important because most the world’s data is currently or destined to be 
computed, rather than collected. By computed we mean generated via mathematical models; 
and by collected we mean gathered by direct forms of observation, survey and measurement. 
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The rise of data science can be attributed to the success of using large volumes of collected 
data to created large volumes of computed data to drive applications.  
 
In extremis, let us observe that whenever a social science topic – in this case surveillance – is 
closely associated with technology – especially with technological tools that collect and 
process data effectively – then the specification of the software tools, i.e., what they do for 
users, can be analysed in much the same way as we have done here. Thus, the sociological 
notions that motivate and shape, and must be represented in the specification of software 
must be as precise as possible. The act of analysing general notions abstractly is 
commonplace in areas of physical sciences, philosophy and linguistics but seems to be rare in 
the social sciences. Keeping in mind some contemporary examples of surveillance 
technologies, we have modelled the main abstract ideas involved in surveillance. At a later 
stage, we foresee the use of formal mathematical methods to analyse much more precisely 
and, in great generality, the sort of fundamental concepts, structures and processes that we 
have isolated in this article. 
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